NewsCenter.ro reviewed the Competition Council’s investigation report, which the authority says proves that 11 banks coordinated for six years the benchmark rate that determines how Romanians repay their loans. The banks have announced that they will challenge both the report and the fines in court.
The 540-page report used by the Competition Council to justify the largest fine ever imposed on Romania’s banking sector – approximately €700 million – was obtained by NewsCenter.ro from parties involved in the case. The document details multiple reasons why the competition watchdog decided to sanction the banks. NewsCenter.ro seeks to present the most significant findings that led investigators to conclude that penalties were warranted. It should be noted that most of the banks involved have already announced plans to challenge both the fines and the investigation report before the courts.
At the same time, the Competition Council’s own annual reports indicate that the institution wins more than 90% of the cases in which its decisions are challenged. Competition Council President Bogdan Chirițoiu also publicly told the banks that he was prepared to defend the sanctions in court, in an interview with HotNews.
The real-time excel document used by banks to Set ROBOR
The report, signed in April 2026 by the Competition Council’s investigation team, describes how ten banks – later joined by Libra Internet Bank – coordinated the level of ROBOR beginning in November 2018.
On June 7, 2026, the Competition Council announced its final decision: total fines of 3.73 billion lei (approximately €710 million), unanimously approved by the institution’s Plenum.
NewsCenter.ro had reported as early as May 26 that the investigation was heading toward sanctions against the banks.
According to the report reviewed by our newsroom, the banks did not coordinate through direct prohibited communications. Instead, investigators describe a more sophisticated mechanism: a shared Excel window, accessible in real time to all participants involved in the daily ROBOR fixing process, allowed banks to observe competitors’ quotations and adjust their own accordingly. The estimated financial impact of the alleged manipulation exceeds 2 billion lei (€400 million), even under a conservative calculation covering only the period between November 2021 and November 2023.
Why the banks were sanctioned
The Competition Council finalized its 540-page investigation report in April 2026, documenting what it describes as the manipulation of the ROBOR benchmark by 11 Romanian banks over a period exceeding six years.
ROBOR is the benchmark interest rate used to calculate borrowing costs for millions of Romanian households and businesses holding loans denominated in the national currency.
Fines imposed on each bank (Decision of June 7, 2026)
| Bancă | Amendă (mil. euro) |
|---|---|
| Banca Transilvania | 166,5 |
| BCR | 109,8 |
| Raiffeisen Bank | 84,1 |
| UniCredit Bank | 81,9 |
| BRD Groupe Société Générale | 78,4 |
| ING Bank | 77,2 |
| CEC Bank | 63,3 |
| Exim Banca Românească | 18,3 |
| Banca Transilvania (pentru OTP Bank) | 16,2 |
| Libra Internet Bank | 8,7 |
| Intesa Sanpaolo România | 5,3 |
| TOTAL | aprox. 710 milioane euro |
How the fines were calculated
The investigation report reviewed by NewsCenter.ro explains in detail the methodology used by the Competition Council’s team when proposing the sanctions.
The starting point was the seriousness of the infringement. Because the coordination of ROBOR quotations was classified as a cartel – the most severe form of anti-competitive conduct under competition law – investigators set the basic amount of the fines at 8% of each bank’s global turnover for Romania, the maximum level recommended for serious cartel violations.
According to the Competition Council, the conduct affected a key benchmark used throughout Romania’s financial system and had the potential to influence borrowing costs paid by millions of consumers and companies. For this reason, the authority treated the case as one of the most serious competition law infringements ever investigated in Romania’s banking sector.
In addition, a 5% increase was applied for each year of participation in the infringement, which was classified as a “long-duration violation” – more than five years for most of the banks involved. Furthermore, all banks received an additional 10% increase as an aggravating circumstance because they continued the conduct even after the investigation was formally launched in October 2022.
No bank benefited from mitigating circumstances. As a result, the calculated fines reached 11.88% of turnover for most banks and 11.44% for Intesa Sanpaolo and OTP Bank. Since these amounts exceeded the legal cap of 10% of total turnover established by Romania’s Competition Law, the final penalties were automatically reduced to that threshold.
The proposed fines therefore reached the legal maximum of 10% of each bank’s global turnover for Romania. Here are the reasons why:
1. A price-fixing cartel among Romania’s largest banks
The investigation concluded that BCR, BRD, Banca Transilvania, ING, Raiffeisen Bank, Exim Banca Românească, CEC Bank, UniCredit, OTP Bank, Intesa Sanpaolo and Libra Internet Bank engaged in a serious anti-competitive agreement – a cartel – through which they coordinated the level of ROBOR, the benchmark rate at which banks lend to one another and, indirectly, the interest rates paid by customers.
According to the report, the conduct violated both Romania’s Competition Law (Article 5) and Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
2. The manipulation began in november 2018 and continued until 2026
The Competition Council found that the anti-competitive conduct began at the end of 2018 and had not ceased by the time the investigation was completed in 2026.
Because the infringement lasted for more than five years, it was classified as a long-duration violation, triggering an additional penalty of 5% for each year of participation on top of the basic fine.
3. Banks continued the conduct even after the investigation began
The Competition Council opened its investigation in October 2022. However, according to the report, none of the participating banks ceased the conduct after becoming aware that they were under investigation.
This continuation of the alleged infringement after the launch of formal proceedings was treated as an aggravating circumstance and increased the fines by an additional 10%.
4. ROBOR rate submissions were not undependent
Through a shared Excel file, all participating banks could see each other’s rate submissions in real time during the daily fixing window, between 10:30 a.m. and 11:00 a.m.
In practice, each bank knew the rates being submitted by competitors before the final benchmark was established and adjusted its own rate submissions accordingly. The report concludes that the independence of the process was therefore largely illusory.
5. Banks adjusted their rates based on competitors’ rates
Investigators found that bank traders not only observed competitors’ rate submissions but actively used them to calibrate their own submissions.
The report describes internal procedures requiring employees to notify management whenever their quotations deviated from those of other market participants, indicating that alignment – rather than independence – had become the norm.
6. Internal procedures encouraged alignment eather than Independence
Documents collected during the investigation showed that several banks required treasury staff to explain to management why their quotations differed from those submitted by competitors on a given day.
According to the Competition Council, these procedures effectively transformed alignment with competitors into an internal obligation, contrary to the independence requirements established by the EU Benchmark Regulation (BMR).
7. The fixing window was extended to facilitate coordination
In 2019, the fixing period was extended from 15 to 30 minutes at the request and with the collective agreement of participating banks. Officially, the change was justified as a solution to technical difficulties.
The investigation concluded that the longer window gave banks more time to observe competitors’ submissions and adjust their own quotations accordingly, thereby facilitating coordination.
8. The banks helped draft the rules governing the process
According to the report, participating banks were actively involved from 2018 onward in drafting the “Rules for Determining ROBID and ROBOR Reference Rates,” the very framework governing the benchmark-setting process.
They discussed provisions, proposed amendments using tracked changes, and collectively agreed on the final version of the rules that would later govern their conduct, without an independent mechanism separating their commercial interests from the regulatory process.
9. They hointly defined the “factors influencing ROBOR”
The banks also jointly drafted and signed a document titled “Factors Influencing ROBOR.”
According to the Competition Council, the document established that whenever the market expected inflation to rise, ROBOR should automatically increase as well.
The document was subsequently published on the websites of participating banks and industry associations, effectively turning what investigators describe as a coordinated industry position into an officially endorsed market narrative.
10. The “market” mentioned in the document was the banks themselves
The report highlights what investigators describe as a striking irony: when the document refers to “market expectations regarding inflation” as a factor driving ROBOR higher, the “market” is not an external force or an objective mechanism. It is the very group of banks under investigation. The banks determined what the market’s expectations were and then increased ROBOR based on forecasts they had collectively agreed upon.
11. ROBOR increases did not track actual inflation
The economic analysis included in the report found that between 2018 and 2024, ROBOR did not follow the actual evolution of inflation.
According to investigators, if the mechanism had operated independently and correctly, a correlation between inflation and ROBOR should have been evident. The absence of such a correlation suggests that ROBOR reflected coordinated decisions by banks rather than objective monetary market conditions.
12. Informal “ACI beer” meetings between Treasury officials
The report documents a series of informal gatherings referred to as “ACI beer” meetings, attended by treasury officials from competing banks – precisely the employees responsible for submitting daily ROBOR quotations.
According to the investigation, these meetings were approved at higher managerial levels and are regarded under European competition case law as presenting a significant risk of collusion. Romanian banking regulations (BNR Regulation No. 4/1995) explicitly prohibit visits between employees of competing banks without prior written authorization.
13. Informal meetings also took place among senior executives
The report further documents informal meetings involving senior decision-makers from the participating banks.
Investigators concluded that coordination was therefore not limited to operational staff but was also acknowledged and discussed at management level.
14. Jointly drafted “market reports” with common forecasts
During 2020 and 2021, several banks jointly prepared documents known as “Market Reports,” summarizing what they described as market expectations regarding liquidity, inflation and interest rates.
According to the report, these documents resulted from discussions among representatives of competing banks, who agreed on a common outlook that was subsequently presented to management and used to influence fixing quotations.
15. Banks signaled future ROBOR increases through public statements
Once the principle had been established that expectations of higher inflation should automatically lead to higher ROBOR levels, public statements forecasting inflation effectively became signals regarding future fixing behavior.
The report states that banks communicated such expectations through press releases, media interviews and financial information platforms such as Bloomberg and Refinitiv. Other participating banks monitored these statements, incorporated them into internal reports and presented them to senior management.
16. Anti-collusion procedures existed only on paper
Each bank under investigation maintained internal compliance procedures formally prohibiting discussions with competitors during the fixing period.
On paper, this appeared consistent with the requirements of the EU Benchmark Regulation (BMR). In practice, however, the same procedures allowed – and in some cases required – real-time monitoring of competitors’ quotations through the shared Excel window.
The report concludes that the BMR focuses not on the existence of written rules but on whether those rules are effective in practice.
17. No bank ever requested a blind contribution window
A key finding of the investigation is that none of the participating banks ever asked either the National Bank of Romania (BNR) or calculation agent Refinitiv to eliminate the real-time visibility of competitors’ quotations.
Although every participant knew that all banks could see each other’s submissions, none objected, raised concerns or withdrew from the fixing process – an option that remained available at all times.
18. EURIBOR uses a fully opaque system – ROBOR Did Not
The report draws a direct comparison with EURIBOR, the European benchmark rate.
Under the EURIBOR system, participating banks can only access their own submission window during the quotation period. Competitors’ contributions become visible only after the fixing process has been completed and are published in aggregated form.
The Competition Council notes that Romanian banks were fully aware of this distinction because many of them also operate in EURIBOR markets, yet they never requested the same standard of transparency protection for ROBOR.
19. ROBOR rates were firm prices, not indicative submissions
The investigation determined that quotations submitted during the daily fixing period between 10:30 a.m. and 11:00 a.m. were not indicative estimates but firm prices.
Under the fixing rules, participating banks were required to transact at those levels for a period of 15 minutes following publication of the ROBOR benchmark.
As a result, investigators argue that real-time access to competitors’ quotations did not merely involve hypothetical information but provided direct access to actual prices at which competitors would trade – information that would ordinarily be considered highly confidential in any competitive market.
20. Estimated effects exceed 2 billion lei (RON) / €380 million
The economic assessment contained in the report estimates that the direct effects of the alleged ROBOR manipulation exceeded 2 billion lei (approximately €380 million) between November 2021 and November 2023.
The report describes this estimate as conservative because it includes only variable-rate loans indexed to 1-, 3-, 6- and 12-month ROBOR maturities. It excludes credit cards, factoring operations and various indirect market effects that may also have been influenced by the benchmark.
21. The effects extended beyond loans directly linked to ROBOR
The report identifies significant indirect effects as well. Fixed-rate loans, overdraft facilities, credit cards and lending products tied to a bank’s internal reference rate are all indirectly influenced by ROBOR through the cost of funding in Romanian lei and the broader yield curve.
None of these effects were included in the main estimate of more than 2 billion lei (€380 million) in damages.
22. Interest income increased sharply across all banks in 2022-2023
Investigators point to another indicator of alleged manipulation: the share of interest income in total revenues for the ten banks participating in the ROBOR panel rose simultaneously during 2022–2023, reaching approximately 82%, compared with 71%–74% between 2019 and 2021.
According to the report, this synchronized increase occurred across all participating banks and coincided with the period of steep ROBOR increases. No similar pattern was observed during the rest of the 2019–2024 period.
23. The alleged manipulation also affected government bond markets
The report argues that ROBOR and the government bond market are closely interconnected.
Investigators concluded that ROBOR levels influenced quotations submitted during the government bond fixing process, which operated under a similar framework. Furthermore, banks submitted bids in Ministry of Finance auctions within ranges established through the government bond fixing mechanism, meaning that the effects of ROBOR manipulation may have extended into the financing of Romania’s public debt.
24. Government bond fixing operated under similar rules and risks
The report warns that the fixing mechanism used for government securities mirrored the structure of the ROBOR process.
It featured the same real-time visibility of competitors’ quotations, the same participating banks and, according to investigators, the same risks of coordination and collusion. The Competition Council suggests that scrutiny could eventually be extended to this area if the Ministry of Finance does not reform the system.
25. The National Bank of Romania raised concerns in 2021 – banks allegedly ignored them
According to the report, the National Bank of Romania (BNR), through official communication No. XXVII/1/558 dated April 12, 2021, requested that participating banks comply fully with the EU Benchmark Regulation (BMR) and implement effective safeguards to prevent ROBOR manipulation.
The investigation concluded that the request produced no meaningful change in market behavior and that the alleged coordination continued uninterrupted.
26. Two BNR officials simultaneously held leadership positions in the Banking Association Managing the fixing process
During the period under investigation, two senior BNR officials – Victor Andrei, a director within the central bank, and Iancu Cuțumișu, a department head – also held leadership positions within ACI Romania (The Financial Markets Association), the organization that helped coordinate the drafting of fixing rules and related documents.
The report describes this situation as a significant conflict of interest because officials responsible for overseeing the market simultaneously participated, in a personal capacity, in the organization through which market participants coordinated their activities.
27. The banks themselves voted to place BNR officials in ACI leadership roles
According to the investigation, the banks under scrutiny proposed and voted for BNR employees – representatives of the institution responsible for administering ROBOR – to hold leadership positions within ACI Romania.
Investigators argue that this created a mechanism through which the regulator became effectively integrated into the representative structure of market participants, facilitating the adoption of fixing rules favorable to banks.
28. The investigation was expanded to include Libra Internet Bank
The investigation launched in October 2022 initially targeted ten banks.
In November 2025, the Competition Council expanded the case to include Libra Internet Bank after it joined the ROBOR panel following Banca Transilvania’s acquisition of OTP Bank Romania.
Because Libra participated for a shorter period, investigators applied a different methodology when calculating the proposed fine: 1% per year of participation, compared with 5% per year for banks involved throughout the entire period.
29. OTP Bank was dissolved, but liability passed to Banca Transilvania
OTP Bank Romania was absorbed by Banca Transilvania in 2024 and formally removed from the commercial register in February 2025.
The report applies the European principle of economic succession, under which Banca Transilvania becomes legally responsible for conduct allegedly committed by OTP Bank during its participation in the ROBOR fixing process.
As a result, Banca Transilvania inherited not only OTP’s assets and liabilities, but also potential administrative liability arising from competition law violations.
30. Proposed fines reached 10% of global turnover, with no mitigating circumstances
The investigation team proposed a base fine equal to 8% of turnover, reflecting the seriousness of the alleged cartel conduct – the highest level recommended for cartel infringements.
This amount was increased by 5% for each year of participation and by an additional 10% aggravating factor because the banks allegedly continued the conduct after the investigation had begun.
The resulting figure – 11.88% of turnover for banks involved throughout the full period – exceeded the legal ceiling of 10% of global turnover established by Romanian competition law.
Consequently, the final sanctions were automatically capped at the statutory maximum of 10%.
The report notes that none of the banks under investigation benefited from any mitigating circumstances.
